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The Financial Services Act (FSA) 1986 was the first comprehensive attempt to create a 
unified statutorily based system of regulation within the UK financial sector. It generated a 
framework of regulation that is in a continuous state of development and modification. In this 
paper we study the development of UK financial regulation between 1986 and 2011. We trace 
how competing theorizations and logics of regulation have led to the institutionalization of a 
meta-form of financial regulation. In doing so, we address the conundrum of conscious, 
strategic theorizations leading to cognitive taken-for-granted institutions by identifying four 
catalysts that contribute to institutionalization when concurring with theorization. These are: 
the evocation of political ideologies, the appropriation of scandals, the growing number of 
actors and the increasing organization of actors. Finally, we argue that sedimentation is the 








Financial regulation has never really had good press. Despite much talk about deregulation, 
the number of laws, rules and external controls continues to grow in contemporary society 
(March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; Moran, 1991, 2003; Power, 1997). This is particularly evident 
in relation to financial markets where events such as Enron, WorldCom, Barings Bank and the 
global financial crash of 2007 – 2009 have raised questions about the role of deregulation of 
financial markets (Crotty, 2009). The events of the last few years suggest that deregulation 
has increased the amounts of risk for financial institutions leading in some cases to 
catastrophic losses and failures. In the US for example, there was the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. In the UK, Northern Rock and parts of Bradford and Bingley were nationalised and 
most of the other banks were – in one way or another rescued by the UK taxpayer. This has 
resulted in further demands for new legislation and calls for the decoupling of retail and 
investment banks as well as changes within the regulatory function in particular, the way it is 
organized and its nature and purpose1 (Cukierman, 2011; Goodhart, 2008). 
 
Against the background of these international events, the UK financial regulatory 
environment provides a captivating story about financial regulation – how it gained notoriety, 
and became synonymous with poor practice and failure(s) of governance. The story begins 
with the inception of financial regulation in 1986 when the Thatcher Government2 unleashed 
the Financial Services Act (FSA) 1986 – otherwise known as ‘Big Bang’ in the UK financial 
environment (Singh, 2007). Prior to this Act, State intervention in the financial services sector 
was less direct and did not manifest itself in the form of regulation that contemporary 
financial services professionals are now faced with. The FSA 1986 generated a framework of 
                                                            
1 For an illustration of the common perception of the financial services industries see Vance (2009). 
2 The Conservative government came into power in 1979 under the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.	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regulation that was in a continuous state of development and modification – a state that 
continued under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000. Nevertheless, 
financial scandals continued – not just in banks but across the whole financial services sector. 
The Maxwell scandal in 1991 made the public wary of occupational pensions, the pensions 
mis-selling scandal3 of 1988-94 made the public wary of personal pensions. Added to this, 
there was the mortgage endowment mis-selling scandal of the early 2000s (Farrow, 2002), the 
collapse of Keydata in 2009 (Levene, 2009) which sold structured products to investors the 
Payment protection insurance (PPI) mis-selling scandal of 2011 (Wearden, 2011) and the 
2012 scandal around the mis-selling of interest rates swaps scandal (Grierson, 2012). 
 
Despite these turbulences, financial regulation has become taken-for-granted as an inevitable 
response to all sorts of problems and scandals of contemporary financial services (cf. for 
instance Vit, 2007). Simultaneously, however, no distinct logic of financial regulation has 
been able to cement itself as the functionally appropriate solution – indeed, every version has 
been portrayed as failing. At the field level, we find proponents of different theories of 
financial regulation (be it market-based or more interventionist) engaged in fierce competition 
fuelled by various scandals. In this paper we address the question how these controversial 
logics, which are regularly perceived to be failing, have led to taken-for-granted State-led, 
organized financial regulation in its contemporary meta-form. Institutional theory gives us the 
vocabulary to address a more general and abstract version of this question: how do conscious 
and sometimes even strategic theorizations (Munir, 2005; Strang & Meyer, 1993) of actors 
lead to cognitive taken-for-granted institutions? This is the conundrum motivating the paper. 
 
                                                            
3 The personal pensions mis-selling review began in 1994, and was aimed at people wrongly sold personal 




This paper seeks to address this gap in our knowledge by tracing the history of personal / 
retail financial services in the UK from 1986 to 2011, and provides insights into how these 
regimes emerge and are shaped (Morgan & Engwall, 1999; Morgan & Knights, 1997). The 
case presented here offers an opportunity to consider from a long-term perspective, how 
various competing logics led to the sedimentation of an institution. Based on documentary 
analysis and secondary sources we trace the changes in financial regulations on three 
dimensions: the theorizations by actors, the institutional logics by which actors group 
themselves around more stable theorizations and the taken-for-granted, cognitive institution 
of financial regulation as such. Scrutinizing the connections between these dimensions we 
withstand the current fashion in institutional theory to confuse every kind of micro-level 
change initiative with substantial institutional change (Suddaby, 2010). 
 
Our contribution is therefore two-fold: First, by observing the conundrum of active 
theorizations leading to taken-for-granted institutions, we identify four catalysts which benefit 
institutionalization when concurring with theorization. These are: the evocation of political 
ideologies, the appropriation of scandals, the growing number of actors and the increasing 
organization of actors. Second, we offer a conceptualization of the form of institutionalization 
which occurs in response to the theorizations and competing institutional logics by mobilizing 
the notion of sedimentation (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Kitchener, 2002; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). We thus answer Munir’s (2011) call for advancing institutional 
theory in the light of the recent economic crisis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section explains the theoretical background. This 
is followed by a description of the research methods and sources of data. Section four 
provides a description of the process of evolution of the regulatory field over the last twenty-
five years. Section five provides an analysis of this story in relation to the theoretical 
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background. This followed by a discussion of the implications and some conclusions for 
future research. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Financial regulations come and go. In the past twenty-five years UK financial services have 
been regulated by different approaches. The question how to best regulate this sector has kept 
a plethora of regulators, regulatees and other stakeholders busy without reaching a convincing 
conclusion. While the volatility of regulatory approaches is well documented in the public 
media, so is the perceived need for financial regulation as such. Abandoning regulation for 
financial services is not an option anymore, a feeling strengthened by the turbulences of the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the more recent euro-crisis. As researchers, this 
leaves us with a conundrum: how did the various actions by numerous actors, which 
concerned themselves with devising regulation usually perceived as failing, lead to the 
successful institutionalization of financial regulation as a whole? Put into the language of 
institutional theory, how did the conscious theorizations of groups of actors lead to the 
sedimentation of a cognitive institution? In this section we will present some theoretical 
concepts necessary to unpack our conundrum and provide a background for the following 
empirical narrative. We will now elaborate on the concepts of theorization, institutionalization 
and institutional logics. 
 
Let us start with actors trying to find the best possible financial regulation – their 
theorizations of financial regulation. Following Strang and Meyer’s (1993) seminal 
interpretation, we define theorization as “the self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and 
effect” (p. 492). Put more simply “theorization is a strategy for making sense of the world” (p. 
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493). The concept has found its way into many models of institutionalization as a distinct 
phase (e.g. Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002) or part of one phase (e.g. Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996). More recent authors (Birkinshaw, Hamel, & Mol, 2008; esp. Munir, 2005; cf. 
also Munir & Phillips, 2005; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007, 2008) have, however, established the 
insight that theorization is a process permeating all stages of institutional change. 
Theorization as a focus of research becomes even more important if we take the social 
constructionist roots of institutional theory seriously (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). Tracing the 
social constructions of actors, especially their theorizations, can lead to deeper insights into 
institutionalization and institutional change, but has so far been curiously marginalized 
(Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003, p. 835). From a 
social constructionist point of view, then, a crucial aspect of institutionalization is how actors 
make sense of their world by mobilizing or generating various theorizations. In our case 
actors try to theorize financial regulation and end up with several approaches to the 
phenomenon. 
 
The other half of our conundrum concerns the concept of institutionalization. Given neo-
institutional theory’s early focus on isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), it has become 
something of a cliché to denounce the lacking attention to institutional change. More recent 
contributions, however, have increasingly focused on the process of institutionalization, the 
becoming of an institution. As Greenwood et al. (2008) and Phillips and Malhotra (2008) 
highlight, a major obstacle institutional theory had to overcome – in order to provide a 
meaningful theory of institutionalization – was a missing consensus on what an institution 
actually is. While some scholars have emphasized the rule-based regulatory nature of 
institutions (for instance Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-­‐Drita, 2001), others have opted for an 
alternative, defining institutions as “more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior 
that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to 
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social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 
4f). Again others, most prominently Scott (2008), have tried to reconcile these views. Phillips 
and Malhotra (2008) show that such a compromise fails due to the methodological and 
epistemological incommensurability of the two perspectives. Since studying theorization is 
argued to benefit from a rigorous social constructionist approach (Munir, 2005) we will use 
the second definition and conceptualize institutions through their taken-for-granted and 
cognitive aspects. This has two implications for our case study: First, the changing financial 
regulations in their various incarnations are not the institution(s) we want to discuss. Rather, 
we understand the cognitive pattern which underlies the idea of financial regulation as such, 
as the relevant institution. We will pick up this aspect in more detail shortly. The second 
implication of this social construction perspective is the conundrum motivating this paper 
which we now can frame more precisely: explicit acts of theorization by actors led to taken-
for-granted institutions which lay beyond the realm of theorization. When theorizations (re)-
occur, this is the trigger for a process of de-institutionalization, i.e. what was taken for granted 
ceases to be so and hence, is no longer an institution (Greenwood et al., 2002; Oliver, 1992). 
 
Existing models of institutional change have only dealt with this conundrum to a limited 
extent. Offering a systematic overview of the plethora of models and approaches to 
institutional change, Van de Ven and Hargrave (2006; 2004) identify four distinct and 
internally consistent approaches. While all four perspectives (institutional diffusion, 
institutional adaptation, institutional design, and collective action) deal, to a varying extent, 
with forms of institutionalization, only collective action models fully allow us to observe 
theorization as part of an active social construction process (Greenwood et al., 2008). 
However, models such as Greenwood et al.’s (2002) do not provide detailed explanations 
about the connection between theorizations and institutionalization. Accounts which discuss 
actual theorizations in some detail (for instance: Munir, 2005; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007, 
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2008) provide rich evidence in this respect. Another approach, allowing for an assessment of 
theorizations particularly suited to our empirical investigations, is the recent debate around 
the concept of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007, 2008; Rao et 
al., 2003; Thornton, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 
 
In their review, Thornton & Ocasio (2008) emphasize that institutional logics provide a link 
between institutions and actions (p. 100). They argue that the benefit of the institutional logics 
approach in bridging this gap is that it focuses on institutional effects rather than focusing on 
non-institutional influences (p. 121). Following this approach, three levels of institutional 
logics are generally researched: the societal, the organizational field and the level of the 
individual. Each of the institutional logics found at one level of analysis corresponds to larger 
or smaller institutional logics at another level. Our own level of analysis is at the inter-
organizational field level. We will use this level as a springboard to discuss the connections of 
our empirical observations to the other levels of institutional logics.  
 
Following Thornton & Ocasio (2008, p. 101) we define institutional logics “as the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, 
and provide meaning to their social reality”. The focus on meaning and social construction 
provides evidence for the closeness of the concept to our understanding of theorization. 
Consistently, we understand institutional logics as groups of associated theorizations. 
Providing actors with patterns of values, beliefs etc., they constitute a frame of reference 
which is more institutionalized than the distinct theorizations initially constituting them. 
However, we are concerned with theorizations (rather than institutional logics) at the 
individual level, as we study conscious intellectual attempts to shape financial regulation 
rather than addressing questions associated with individual-level institutional logics such as 
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identities or identity work. In our empirical investigation we found four institutional logics 
competing at the field level: profession-based, State-based, market-based as well as market - 
and risk-based logics of financial regulation. At the time of writing none of these competing 
logics had marginalized others permanently but none had gained the status of a taken-for-
granted, cognitive field-level institution (Greenwood et al., 2002) despite some degree of 
diffusion (Ansari & Phillips, 2011; Colyvas & Jonsson, 2011). At the field level we observed 
a dynamic process in which theorizations challenge and contaminate ideal type institutional 
logics. Our findings suggest, that despite the criticisms of the various incarnations of financial 
regulation, its’ resilience can be explained by the idea that an institution had sedimented 
itself; financial regulation as such, and a certain meta-form of it has become beyond taken-
for-granted. Note that institutional logic, as a concept, is a connection between  wider society 
and the individual level; the fact that logics are competing at the middle field level is not the 
source of change but rather an outcome of change (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 118). 
Following this original interpretation of the concept of institutional logics we suggest that the 
field level is a pivotal link between single and distinct theorizations (or groups thereof) and 
larger institutions. Furthermore, we argue that, we need to better understand the mechanisms 
by which the three dimensions of our model depicted in figure 1 are linked in order to fully 
appreciate the role of institutional logics in this process. 
 
Our research therefore draws on three dimensions of taken-for-grantedness (theorizations, 
institutional logics, field-level institutions), depicted in figure 1. We will pick up on these 
three dimensions and how they help us to unpack the conundrum of conscious theorizations 
(dimension 1) resulting in taken-for-granted institutions (dimension 3) in the discussion 
section. 
 




Our interest is to elaborate how strategic and intentional theorizations (dimension 1) lead to 
taken-for-granted, cognitive institutions (dimension 3) which are beyond strategic reflection 
(without a de-institutionalization process). As outlined by Thornton & Ocasio (2008), 
institutional logics serve as a linking concept between the individual and the societal level. 
The institution we scrutinize is financial regulation (in the UK) which firmly resides at the 
field level. On the other hand, institutional logics, link field and societal levels. This means 
that institutional logics and institutions form a dialectical relationship. Institution logics (e.g. 
market-based financial regulation) draw on institutions on various levels (e.g. the market) but 
since they inform actors’ behaviour, they also constitute and reproduce these institutions. 
While prior literature has extensively discussed how large institutional logics such as market 
logics have shaped behaviour and institutions (Lounsbury, 2007; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999), we place our focus on how strategic theorizations influence institutions. 
Before we elaborate on the logics evident in the field of UK financial regulation and discuss 





To address our core objective to understand the formation of the regulatory field – in 
particular, the sedimentation of the institution of financial regulation and the competing logics 
and theorizations within it over the twenty-five year time frame, we conducted a qualitative 
analysis of a range of secondary and archival (documentary) data. As the formation of the 
regulatory field from 1986 to 2011 involved interactions between the regulators and the 
regulated companies, our analysis focuses predominantly on these actors. However, other 
actors, for instance: the Government, Government ministers; the Bank of England and the 
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Treasury, media correspondents, consumer groups and other regulatory bodies (such as the 
Office of Fair trading (OFT)) entered and exited the field at various stages throughout the 
process. The archival material encompasses the formal regulations of the time-period in 
question. This includes documents issued by the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and 
associated regulators, as well as the Financial Services Authority (FSA). For example, 
publications, policy notices and documents, consultation papers, discussion papers, press 
releases, FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance, policy reports and speeches and newspapers 
such as the Financial Times and other UK broadsheets (see Table 1 for a full list of data 
sources).    
 
The documentary / archival data falls into two categories: the first set of data relates to phases 
1-3 (1986-1997) when the lead regulator was the SIB. The second set of data phase 4 (1997-
2011) was collected under the tenure of the FSA. The data set analysed in relation to phases 
1-3 consists of both archival and secondary data. This includes documents from the SIB and 
associated regulatory organization. The secondary data is drawn from a series of studies on 
the regulation of personal financial services conducted between 1990-97 at the Financial 
Services Research Centre, UMIST, UK. These studies were undertaken by academic 
researchers (including one of the current authors) on behalf of a group of financial services 
companies and were presented to practitioners as unpublished ‘technical’ reports.  
Specifically, the data presented here is drawn from six studies that focused on strategic issues 
companies faced in relation to regulation. These in-depth studies provide rare insights into the 
impact of regulation on companies and their responses – providing valuable understandings of 
the role of various actors and their contribution to the various logics and theorizations in the 
formation of the financial regulatory field. The first study, (full details in Morgan & Knights, 
1997) looked at the impact of the Financial Services Act on life insurance companies. The 
second is a study that focuses on strategic issues in personal financial services (Morgan, 
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1992). The third is a series of interviews conducted in 1995 on the Training and Competence 
Initiative and regulation more generally (reported in Morgan, 1995, 1996a) and finally, a 
questionnaire survey plus a range of interviews conducted by Morgan (1996a, 1996b) and 
Morgan and Soin (1999) that explored the impact of regulation, attitudes towards compliance 
and the role of compliance cultures within financial services organizations. In addition, the 
paper draws on the work of Morgan and Soin (1997) which provides an overview of the 
structure and function of The Financial Services Act (1986) – in particular the organization of 
regulation and the associated regulators. It also synthesises the six studies identified above 
and provides an in-depth narrative of the changes in the regulatory field from 1986 –1997. 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the importance of the “organizational” approach to 
regulation (Morgan & Soin, 1999). This differs from the perspective presented in this paper 
that focuses on the sedimentation of the institution of financial regulation. 
 
The findings in these reports were (re)-analysed in order to understand the practice of 
regulation, the strategies employed by companies and attitudes towards compliance within 
companies. Following Suddaby, Cooper and Greenwood (2007), these studies were not used a 
primary data sources, but to inform our understandings of the theorizations of a particular set 
of actors in this process – namely the regulated companies. 
 
The data analyzed in relation to phase 4 (1997 - 2011) consists of archival data largely drawn 
from the FSA and newspaper articles. A range of documents were examined including: FSA 
publications, policy notices and documents, press releases, consultation and discussion papers 
and progress reports. The data is therefore predominantly accessed via written material and 
the external communications of regulators. While this might not be adequate for all fields of 
research we argue that it is suitable for financial regulation. Whereas in other, non-regulatory, 
fields the tacit interpretations of actors and subsequent actions are of paramount importance, 
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regulation can by definition, only have effects when it is expressed verbally or more 
commonly in written language. Therefore we take the written regulation and to a lesser degree 
public statements of their intentions as deliberate and carefully constructed – providing 
evidence of actors’ theorizations and the social construction shaping institutions. 
 
The data was analysed in an iterative process in which each author first identified central 
themes: the main organizational actors in the field (see table 2) and the four phases of 
regulation (see table 3). This was followed by a further round of data interrogation in which 
we developed understandings of the theorizations of organizational actors, the under-pinning 
logics and how these logics were changing through the phases. This led us to a final iteration 
in which we identified our four catalysts that, we will later argue, contributed to the 
sedimentation process. We argue that institutionalisation occurs when things get ‘taken-for-
granted’ i.e., they are not ‘talked about anymore’ in public discussions and hence become 
sedimented in some way. One such example could be the risk-based approach: post financial 
crisis, the discourse and theorizations have shifted to pronouncements around the end of ‘soft 
touch’ regulation (Elliott, 2008) and more ‘intervention’ and ‘intrusion’ at the product design 
stage (FSA, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b). Nevertheless, the risk-based approach is still a central 
feature of the regulatory approach adopted by the regulator. We will discuss the theoretical 
mechanisms underlying this process after presenting our empirical material in depth in the 
next section. 
 
4. The Regulatory Structure (1986 - 2011) 
 
In this section we trace the development of UK financial services regulation in some detail. 
We start by outlining the key organizations and their foundations in chronological order. The 
main part of this section addresses the four phases of financial regulation from 1986 to the 
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present day, and introduces what the actors in the field recognize as contemporary financial 
regulation. Each phase is characterised by the (co)existence of four competing logics – the 
profession-based, the State-based, the market-based as well as the market- and risk-based 
logic – but in each phase one dominates. In phase one, the phase of “practitioner based 
statute-backed regulation” (Laurence, 1999p. 662) the profession is presented as the dominant 
logic.  Organizations in the field were encouraged to regulate themselves through normative 
isomorphic pressures expressed between practitioners. In this phase, the coercive pressure of 
the State is largely absent. In phase two, the dominant logic was the State and this phase was 
characterised by “command and control”, “State intervention” and “protection”, which 
resulted in rigid enforcements that were argued to inhibit innovations. In the third phase, the 
phase of “competition” and the “the market”, it is the market logic that dominates. Finally, the 
fourth phase presents a variation of market-based regulation by emphasising the notion of risk 
within this frame. Buzzwords such as “risk-based regulation” and “risk management” 
dominate in this period. These phases are not static or discrete; instead, they are dynamic, 
overlapping and fluid with the preceding phase loosely merging into the next. 
 
The Emergence of Financial Regulation in the UK 
Before we elaborate on the individual phases and logics we will provide an overview of the 
main organizational actors in the field, the organizational dramatis personae of our story. The 
Financial Services Act (1986) resulted in the implementation of a regulatory framework that 
had a largely self-regulatory element and consisted of a two-tier structure. Regulation of 
securities and investments was delegated to the Securities and Investment Board Ltd (SIB). 
The SIB was a private company and had a legally private character. It was funded via a levy 
on the markets and its members were appointed jointly by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry and the Governor of the Bank of England (Morgan & Soin, 1999). Major areas 
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within the financial services sector were overseen by self-regulatory bodies (SRO’s) – under 
the overall supervision of the SIB, which was responsible to Parliament – initially through the 
Department of Trade and industry and then through the Treasury (Clarke, 1999; Laurence, 
1999). The SIB had four main tasks. The first was responsibility for devising ‘model rules’. 
The second was a policing role in respect to a range of offences against the Act. The third 
responsibility was for the licensing and supervision of individual businesses (although in 
general, it encouraged businesses to join the lower tier regulators – the SRO’s). Finally, it was 
responsible for authorising the ‘self-regulatory organizations’. 
 
The SRO’s were core to the regulatory process. Their principle function was to authorise 
members to carry out their particular business and they were responsible for the licensing and 
supervision of individual businesses. Any investment business which operated without 
authorisation was subject to fines and imprisonment (Morgan & Soin, 1999; White Paper, 
1985). Five SRO’s were initially established: FIMBRA (the Financial Intermediaries, 
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association) and LAUTRO (the Life Assurance and Unit 
Trust Regulatory Organisation) were the SROs responsible for ensuring the protection of 
investors in the market for retail investment products. The AFBD (the Association of Futures 
Brokers and Dealers) licensed and supervised firms in commodities and futures. The TSA (the 
Securities association) was formed from the old regulatory arm of the Stock Exchange and 
IMRO (the Investment Managers Regulatory Organisation), specialised in the regulation of 
investment fund managers. In 1991 the AFBD and the TSA combined to form the SFA (the 
Securities and Futures Authority). In 1992 FIMBRA and LAUTRO, as well as some parts of 
IMRO, combined to form the PIA (the Personal Investment Authority), which was 
responsible for investor protection for retail financial services. The PIA regulated banks, 
building societies, insurance companies and brokers. Table 2 provides a summary of the 




The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was formed in 2001, under the Labour Government, 
which came to power in 1997. The two-tier structure (of SIB and the SRO’s) was abolished 
and, in an attempt to eliminate the fragmented nature of regulation, the Government imposed 
consolidated State regulation for the financial sector. The Authority is the single statutory 
regulator directly responsible for the regulation of deposit taking, insurance and investment 
business. The FSA adopted an integrated approach to authorising firms. There is a single 
process, common to all applicants, which enables a firm to seek permission to conduct a 
number of different regulated activities (FSA, 2000a, 2000b). There is also an emphasis on 
both consumer and practitioner involvement (FSA, 1997a, 1997c). FSA staff are drawn from 
a wide range of backgrounds – financial, industry, legal and accounting professions, the civil 
service, other regulatory bodies and consumer organisations. In addition, individuals are 
seconded to and from other relevant sectors. The FSA’s approach suggests that companies 
with ‘good’ risk management systems will face a ‘lighter’ regulatory touch. And, the 
regulator will be making assessments of a company’s commitment to regulatory objectives, 
their record of compliance, the quality of management – in particular, senior management 
responsibility – and capacity to comply. These considerations will influence the regulators 
motives to intervene in a company’s affairs (FSA, 2000a, 2002, 2006d). 
 
*** insert table 2 around here *** 
 
Phase 1: 1986 – 1988: Profession-based logic 
In 1986, a complex web of events, competing political logics and theories on how financial 
markets work culminated in the Financial Services Act (1986) otherwise known as the ‘Big 
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Bang’ of UK financial regulation (Singh, 2007). From its inception political ideologies had a 
decisive influence on financial regulations, especially in the form of the rhetoric of 
deregulation4. Deregulation was theorized as a response to demands for a more flexible 
market organisation, the development of overseas investment and international trading in 
equities, improved technology and communication, and the developing role of institutional 
investors in the market. Government, regulators and regulatees alike argued that deregulation 
would enable London to attract a substantial proportion of international financial business 
(Morgan & Engwall, 1999). Successful regulation was theorized as one of non-intervention 
and a conviction that free market forces, healthy competition and self-regulation would 
provide effective regulation (Augur, 2000). 
 
As the field was still in its infancy, only a limited number of actors participated in the debates 
leading to the 1986 regulation: The Government, the Bank of England, the Treasury, SIB, the 
SROs and the regulated companies. There was a general feeling of uncertainty about the 
purpose and nature of the regulatory process and consequently the organization of the 
regulators was highly fragmented (Morgan & Soin, 1999). Soon, a powerful group of actors 
emerged to fill the lack of meaning of financial regulation: industry professionals and 
practitioners. These practitioners shaped, through their theorizations, the logic dominating this 
phase of financial regulation. This interpretation is strengthened by the SIB’s first Chairman, 
Sir Kenneth Berrill, who characterised the logic of this phase as being “practitioner-based, 
statute-backed regulation” (Laurence, 1999, p. 662) or, ‘self-regulation with significant 
practitioner input’ (SIB, 1990, p. 4). The influence of practitioners is reflected in the 
                                                            
4 Deregulation, although widely considered to be a genuine alternative to regulation, usually encompasses a large 
amount of rules and regulations. The difference is that the state takes on an alternate role: instead of direct 
intervention, the state takes on the function of a ‘game-keeper’ enforcing the rules of the game. This enforcement 
is, however, again achieved through rules and regulation (Harcourt, 2011). The situation is further complicated 
as professionals in the field, as we will see, promoted a theorization of regulation which rhetorically drew on 
deregulation but involved other interpretations of the term. 
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governing body which comprised key individuals from the financial services sector because 
this was seen as the source of the most qualified people (Moran, 1991) – people who were 
theorized to understand the markets better than the regulators.  
 
This first phase of financial regulation focused on establishing the system. While regulatory 
agencies participated in this initial phase, it was the practitioners’ theorizations that exerted 
the strongest influence over regulation. Consequently, the predominant governance 
mechanism in this phase drew on a professional logic. Professional governance is 
characterized by relatively loose accountability, a high degree of autonomy and a preference 
for collegial or peer-based controls (Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990). Thus, in this 
stage, practitioner based controls and self-regulation were theorized as superior to coercive 
State controls. Regulation by the State was seen as ‘unnecessary’ and ‘disruptive’ and the 
regulators had to continually justify their actions to the regulated companies (Morgan & Soin, 
1999).  
 
In a climate of neo-liberalism, practitioners drew strategically on political ideologies to 
promote their version of deregulation. In the 1980s political climate of ‘Reaganomics’ in the 
US and ‘Thatcherism’ in the UK, deregulation was a fashionable discursive resource. 
However, the practitioner logic actually differed from pure neo-liberal economics as the State 
was not theorized as the ‘game-keeper’ and market mechanisms were largely absent. We can 
therefore identify the first catalyst which helped theorizations permanently shape an 
institution: the evocation of political ideologies. We will return to the relevance of this 
catalyst for the sedimentation of an institution later. For now, it is important to note that these 




In competition with the profession-based logic, the State-sponsored Gower report (1982, 
1984, 1985) identified four areas of concern with respect to investor protection: First that 
there was no single, regulator, prosecutor or complaints bureau. Second there was nothing to 
regulate takeovers and third, there was virtually no regulation of the marketing of 
investments, ‘cowboy’ fund managers and investment advisers. Finally, the scope and amount 
of investment by consumers was increasing. Essentially, proponents of State-based 
regulations challenged practitioners’ theorizations by suggesting the need for regulation in the 
name of investor protection. 
 
After a relatively short period of domination of profession-based theorizations, the 
competition between practitioners and advocates of State intervention escalated in late 1987 
and early 1988. Some practitioners felt that Sir Kenneth Berrill, the founding Chairman of the 
SIB was promoting an approach that was too ‘legalistic’ and ‘inflexible’. What were 
described as “powerful groups within the City” (Financial Times, 29 March 1988; Sunday 
Times, 21 February 1988) managed to prevent the renewal of Sir Kenneth Berrill’s contract as 
head of the SIB. Despite this success, the rule of practitioners started to wane after proponents 
of a more interventionist theorization of financial regulation were provided with heavy 
ammunition, in the form of problems with the commission based reward system and the mis-
selling of financial products – the most striking of which was the pensions scandal: The 
essence of this scandal was that between 1988 and 1994, many people had been persuaded to 
leave perfectly respectable pensions schemes and invest the lump sum withdrawn into a 
personal pension. As a result, many were found to be worse off when they came to 
pensionable age than they would have been if they stayed in the same occupational pension 
scheme (Morgan & Soin, 1999). Through the theorization of this scandal, practitioners lost 
influence. The scandal was connected to issues surrounding financial regulation and 
practitioners could not provide a credible response. As we will see, the pensions mis-selling 
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scandal could not be convincingly addressed until 1997. For now, however, it is important to 
note that although financial regulation had not yet found a specific form or wide-spread 
legitimacy, the debate was picking up pace. 
 
Phase 2: 1988 – 1993: State-based logic 
The pensions mis-selling scandal and the commission based reward system proved to be a 
decisive moment in the early incarnation of financial regulation in the UK. Actors who 
theorized the scandal as tightly linked to overall financial regulation, reaching far beyond 
advice on pensions, quickly gained power. A side effect of these competing theorizations and 
logics was that financial regulation as such started to cement itself in both the minds of actors 
and the general public. We therefore identify the appropriation of scandals as a second 
catalyst for the sedimentation of an institution. Nevertheless, at this stage the sedimentation 
was not very far advanced. 
 
Now the pendulum had swung in favour of proponents of State intervention – mainly the 
regulatory bodies themselves – a different kind of regulation was dominating: a State-based 
logic of regulation. Self-regulation was now deemed ineffective (Morgan & Soin, 1999). 
Under the State logic of financial regulation, there was a shift to a more ‘interventionist’ 
approach by the regulator. And, although the structures didn’t change, the way they operated 
did and, as a result of the theorization of the scandal, the discourse on regulation shifted 
towards customer and investor ‘protection’. 
 
Another important aspect that was evident in this phase was that the debate became more 
institutionalized as more actors entered the field. While the abstract category of “the 
consumer” was frequently evoked in public debates, two more distinct organizational actors 
emerged: first the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) entered the fray. The OFT (1993a, 1993b) 
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came up with a number of criticisms of the commission based reward system most notably 
that they were concealed from the public. On the back of this, SIB introduced another actor – 
an independent consultancy service – National Economic Research Associates (NERA), to 
consider the impact of disclosing commissions. Their most prominent theory was that 
disclosure would increase competitive pressure in the industry and enable consumers to make 
a ‘better informed’ choice about products (Morgan & Soin, 1999). These new actors still drew 
loosely on the rhetoric of neo-liberalism but de-emphasized the deregulatory aspects. 
 
Interventionist changes by the State related to two key principles – ‘know your customer’ and 
‘best advice’. The objective underlying these was to ensure that: “the seller of the product had 
gathered sufficient information about the current and future financial position of the client to 
enable him / her to advise on the best product (and premium level) out of the portfolio of 
products which they were authorised to sell” (Morgan & Soin, 1999, p. 170). A key aspect of 
this related to sales force training. It emerged that: “…there was little or no training for sales 
people in most companies. As their earnings were usually based on commissions, they were 
only paid when they sold. Companies therefore took on more and more sales people to whom 
they gave minimal training – perhaps a couple of days. The sales people then either sank or 
swam! Either way, it cost the companies very little because of the commission system… 
…The notion that people with a couple of days training could even come close to meeting 
‘know your customer’ and ‘best advice’ requirements was untenable” (Morgan & Soin, 1999, 
p. 171). LAUTRO intervened by introducing the Training and Competence Initiative (TCI). 
Under this initiative every member of LAUTRO had to produce a scheme that showed how 
they were going to train and develop their sales force. 
 
Again, the prevalence of this logic was only temporal. By 1991 several of the regulatory 
agencies’ theorizations of successful financial regulation faced dissent by other actors. Soon 
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the market-based logic would take over as the dominant logic, promoting yet another 
interpretation of deregulation. As part of this struggle, the various regulatory bodies offered 
competing assessments of the situation and the on-going pensions mis-selling scandal. SIB 
and LAUTRO in particular disagreed on a number of issues. Questions started to (re)-emerge 
about the nature and purpose of and the role of the regulatory bodies – as well as the style, 
structure and effectiveness of regulation (DTI, 1992a). SIB, in its role as lead regulator, was 
forced to act on these controversies but it could only act through the SROs which remained 
dominated by industry interests i.e. the professional logic. In 1992, perceived problems of 
legitimacy and lax monitoring procedures, in particular on the part of LAUTRO, triggered the 
merger of LAUTRO, FIMBRA and parts of IMRO into a new regulatory authority, the 
Personal Investment Authority (PIA). Once again, the field had been re-shuffled, both in 
terms of power structures and in terms of organization of the sector. 
 
This phase has a number of common features with the phase preceding it: different actors 
compete in promoting their theorizations with only the temporal prevalence of a single logic. 
However, the discourse has already sedimented itself in a more solid form: financial 
regulation, despite disagreement on its shape, has become largely taken-for-granted. A key 
factor we can identify in this process is our third catalyst: the growing number of actors 
participating in the field. The discourse of financial regulation had to reach a critical mass in 
order to become taken-for-granted. Additionally, one of the new actors in this field, NERA, 
proved to be a successful advocate for a new logic of theorizations in the next phase:  market-
based regulation. 
 
Phase 3: 1993 – 1997: Market-based Logic 
In 1992 the pensions mis-selling scandal was still widely discussed in the field. Here we learn 
something important concerning our catalysts – in particular, the evocation of ideologies 
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(catalyst 1) and the appropriation of scandals (catalyst 2), which is, that these strategies are 
not exclusive to one group of actors. The theorization of the pension mis-selling scandal as an 
issue of financial regulation came back to haunt the proponents of the State-based logic as 
advocates of the competing market-based logic turned their own arguments against them by 
connecting the scandal to deep-seated issues about the way in which financial products had 
been sold. In this phase the market was the dominant logic perceived most suitable to address 
past problems. Again neo-liberal ideologies of deregulation were evoked – although this time 
emphasising the market mechanism. A powerful actor advocating this group of theorizations 
was the new Chairman of the SIB from 1992-1997, Andrew Large. His arguments were most 
apparent in the Large Report issued in 1993. 
 
The Large Report provides an influential example for a new form of theorization. Prior 
practices of the lead regulator SIB were portrayed as lacking “bite” (specification) and thus 
market-based regulations were justified as a veritable course of action. Current practices  (like 
concealing commissions) meant “that there could be no proper ‘choice’ and therefore no 
proper market in which competitive pressures could operate” (Morgan & Soin, 1999, p. 176), 
and that the “role of regulation was to act in order to ensure that such a market came into 
being”, (Morgan & Soin, 1999, p. 176). This idea of regulation as ‘market-making’ was, part 
of the broader neo-liberalist agenda, or free market dominance, that was taking place in other 
sectors in the UK at the time for example, utilities. 
 
Morgan and Soin (1999, p. 176) highlight an interesting aspect of the pervasiveness of the 
market-argument in the field: There was a shift in emphasis from investor ‘protection’ to 
investor ‘choice’. This effectively shifted responsibility onto the consumers and crucially, 
away from the regulators. In addition, “this language of the market and choice also resonated 
with that of the companies themselves. It made it harder for them to resist the logic of the 
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regulators, reducing them to the claim that customers did not want to know these sort[s] of 
details.” Morgan and Soin (1999, p. 176). Once again, the rhetoric of deregulation resurfaced 
in yet another form. The Deregulation Task Force that was set up by the Government to tackle 
‘red-tape’ placed a firm emphasis on the notion of “regulatory effectiveness”, arguing the 
need for cost benefit analysis of regulatory actions (DTI, 1992a, 1994; Deregulation Initiative 
1996a, 1996b, 1996c). 
 
These theorizations manifested themselves through distinct changes in the field. Two 
noteworthy developments concerned the regulatory SROs and the consumers. First, some of 
the SROs, namely FIMBRA, LAUTRO, and IMRO, were merged in 1992 to form the 
Personal Investment Authority (PIA). The PIA went on to promote a more homogenous and 
market-based theorization explicitly developing a strategy involving consumer representatives 
and consumer opinions (Morgan & Soin, 1999, p. 178). The PIA was made up of a governing 
body of non-industry representatives for example, academics and consumer lobbyists. In 
1996, they created a special Consumer Panel (PIA, 1996b, 1996c) as a means of bringing the 
consumer into the regulatory debate and so, another new actor entered the regulatory field. 
 
In this phase we can observe the fourth and final catalyst of the sedimentation of an 
institution, the increasing organization of actors. The more fragmented actors such as the 
diverse regulatory agencies and the formerly disorganized “consumers”, while not including 
all participants of their respective categories, became more organized and structured, 
promoting certain theorizations and logics. This further institutionalized the need for financial 
regulation as well as the debates around its form. As we will see the specific form proved 
unstable, yet the debate took on a more coherent and sustained form. Simultaneously, 




In contrast to SIB, the PIA developed a different idea of ‘regulatory effectiveness’ which was 
to be measured in a range of ways, most of which were not financial but were indicators of 
the quality of selling, for example, the persistency ratio. In an effort to further organize the 
different actors, the PIA instituted what was known as the Evolution Project (PIA, 1996a) “to 
discuss with a wide range of stakeholders including companies the future direction of 
regulation, including the possible selective elimination and/or reduction of certain regulatory 
requirements” (Morgan & Soin, 1999). These activities further contributed to the tensions, 
conflicts and contradictions between the regulators particularly, as this was at odds with the 
SIB’s approach that markets and competition could sit comfortably together. The PIA also 
became embroiled in the aforementioned pensions mis-selling scandal which ultimately 
undermined its credibility. 
 
Despite the Deregulation Task Force and neo-liberal ideology, proponents of State 
intervention still had a say in the field and challenged the dominant market-based logic. The 
State logic was clearly evident in the activities of the PIA and its’ pursuit of consumer 
protection, rather than ‘choice’. A further example of the lingering State logic relates to 
initiatives around training and competence – but there was a notable shift in tone. For 
example, the Training Handbook (IMRO, 1996) was written to “assist Firms with the 
implementation of the Training and Competence Rules and Code” (p.5), stating that (the 
Training Handbook) is ‘not formal guidance and is in no way meant to be prescriptive” (p.5).  
 
In this phase we saw a more structured and advanced debate on financial regulation in the 
UK. All four catalysts were evident to varying degrees in the struggles and social construction 
processes of actors. The pension mis-selling scandal continued to be used as ammunition to 
torpedo other competing logics. Political ideologies, neo-liberalism and deregulation more 
specifically, were evoked and appropriated to fit rivalling theorizations. Although more 
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people participated in the discourse, i.e. the number of actors grew – they were organized 
more tightly promoting a more limited set of theorizations. 
 
The institution of financial regulation in its meta-form had already sedimented itself to some 
degree that is to say, a constraint on what is thinkable and legitimate i.e. the cognitive taken-
for-granted nature of an institution. Parts of the discourse, such as the profession-based logic 
or the abandoning of financial regulation in its State-led form, were already excluded from the 
debate. Therefore we see a process of the institutionalization of financial regulation, despite 
the individual regulations being continuously theorized as failing. This process continued in 
the next phase. 
 
Phase 4: 1997 – present: Market- & Risk-based Logic 
In phase four, the dominant logic of financial regulation is what we term a market- and risk-
based logic because it essentially relies on market mechanisms extended by theorizations 
incorporating the notion of risk. Despite the election of a new Labour Government in 1997, 
neo-liberal ideologies continued to be evoked because the new Government wanted to 
distance themselves from the old style paternalism they had traditionally been associated with 
– and were intent on pursuing the former Governments policy on ‘rolling back the State’. 
While a new range of actors enter the field, the evocation of a neo-liberal ideology (catalyst 1) 
continued. 
 
The Labour Government maintained the commitment to market-based regulation, but was 
also keen to emphasise its dedication to consumer protection and consequently the number of 
actors further increased. A Financial Services Consumer panel was set up in 1998, the 
Chairman was the former Chairman of the PIA consumer panel that had been set up in 1996 
(FSA, 1998b). Consultation papers such as FSA (1998b) focused on both consumer and 
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practitioner involvement as well as input from other groups “including public and voluntary 
bodies with an interest in consumer protection, … (in particular, lawyers and accountants), 
other experts (for example, actuaries, academics and think tanks) …” (FSA, 1998b, p. 3). In 
addition, another – maybe even stronger – variation on the theme of market-based financial 
regulation was provided in subsequent regulations by a new focus on risks and risk 
management. 
 
The market ideology adopted by the SIB was broadened to encompass the ‘risk-based’ 
approach to regulation (FSA, 1998a; Hutter & Power, 2000) and is based on the Turnbull 
guidance (ICAEW, 1999). Significantly, risk-based regulation is about regulatory agencies 
becoming explicit about their limited resources and the need to direct them to where they are 
needed most (Power, 2007) – thus continuing the ideas around cost effective regulation that 
were apparent in phase three (FSA, 2006c). While this can be traced back to the Large Report 
(1993) (cf. phase 3), this change was coupled with the creation of a new regulator – the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) which was formed in 2001, and assumed its powers under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000. In effect, the regulatory actors become more 
organized (catalyst 4): The FSA was a single super-regulator, which took over the functions 
of SIB, the SROs and part of the functions of the Bank of England. 
 
This new set of theorizations further marginalized the earlier State-based logic.  For instance, 
the FSA Training and Competence Sourcebook (FSA, 2000c, p. 1) states that: “The rules and 
guidance set out in the T&C sourcebook provide the industry with a more flexible and less 
prescriptive approach to meeting the appropriate standards of competence for employees”. 
And, instead of rule-making based on detailed prescriptions, there was a shift to high-level 
principles (FSA, 2000a, 2006d) for example, by reducing ‘the scope of our detailed rules on 
training and competence’ (FSA, 2005, p. 1). In 2006, the Chief Executive of the FSA argued 
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that there was a danger that ‘we’ (the regulator) are heading towards over regulation and that 
“only carefully judged regulatory intervention can add to rather than detract from the positive 
impacts of market forces.” (FSA, 2006a)	  
 
Proponents of the market- and risk-based logic theorized the regulatory agencies as taking a 
strategic overview and disengaging from operational questions. As (Haines, 1998, p. 335) 
highlights: They took a “flexible approach to setting standards and supervision, reflecting the 
nature of the business activities concerned, the extent of risk within particular firms and 
markets, quantity of firms management controls and the relative sophistication of the 
consumers involved” For example, the FSA started a campaign of ‘naming and shaming’ 
companies who had not responded swiftly enough the pensions mis-selling crisis highlighted 
above (FSA, 1997b, p. 31). Again, the scandal was used to blame divergent practices, this 
time publicly. Ironically, the pensions mis-selling scandal which was first used to target 
profession-based theorizations by advocates of the State-based logic was then used to 
undermine this very State-based logic and even some proponents of market-based versions of 
regulation. 
 
The market- and risk-based form of financial regulation enjoyed a relatively long tenure. We 
hypothesize two possible causes for this success: First, the sedimentation process had 
advanced to a considerable stage, effectively narrowing down thinkable alternatives and 
legitimate theorizations of financial regulation. The very concept of sedimentation suggests 
that actors’ efforts to de-institutionalize an institution will face stronger opposition as the 
sedimentation process advances – as will daring and new theorizations. The second possible 
reason for the success of the market- and risk-based logic of financial regulation is the 
absence of catalyst two, the appropriation of scandals, in the early 2000s. The IT-bubble that 
hit the US hard and the collapse of WorldCom and Enron were not theorized as connected 
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with faulty UK financial regulation – at least not by the most powerful actors in the field. This 
underscores our argument that scandals need to be theorized in order to have an effect on the 
sedimentation of an institution and do not do so automatically. 
 
The story of UK financial regulation took a sharp turn with the global financial crisis of 2008. 
At the time of writing more interventionist ideas have started to re-surface based on 
theorizations of the crisis. In 2008, the chairman of the FSA announced the ‘days of soft-
touch regulation were over’ (Elliott, 2008).We will discuss some of these on-going 
developments in the implications section. As of now we cannot draw definite conclusions on 
what the next dominant logic will be. What we can conclude, however, is that financial 
regulation is a taken-for-granted part of our contemporary business world and that we are yet 
to encounter the final solution to the problem of its form. Table 3 provides a concluding 
summary of the evolution of financial regulation in the UK from 1986 to 2011. 
 




Overall, our findings, portrayed in four phases, are akin to those in other sectors. For instance, 
Scott et al. (2000) found in their extensive study of the US health care sector a new 
managerial-market-based logic building on earlier logics of medical professionals and the 
federal government. Blomgren & Sahlin (2007) could reproduce these findings in a Swedish 
context. We follow these latter authors in their interpretation of the repeated finding of this 
pattern – namely, that these developments correspond to a wider societal development. We 
can also reproduce some key observations around these developments such as the different 
phases were not entirely clear-cut and built on each other (Blomgren & Sahlin, 2007, p. 158). 
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Our study, however, differs in some important respects. Empirically, the financial services 
sector constitutes a unique case, as the managerial logic found to enter other fields such as 
health care or higher education publishing (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) was part of the 
profession from the start. Theoretically, we identified four catalysts which only partially 
correspond to drivers of change found in the existing literature. We also focus on the additive 
aspect of institutional logics which we argue is best represented by the notion of 
sedimentation (Cooper et al., 1996). We will now elaborate, first, on the four catalysts and, 
second, on the concept of sedimentation. 
 
a) Four catalysts 
 
In our empirical investigations we found four catalysts which contribute to the sedimentation 
of an institution beyond competing field level institutional logics. We identified these 
catalysts as follows: the evocation of political ideologies, the appropriation of scandals, the 
growing number of actors and the increasing organization of actors. The first two catalysts 
concern specific forms of theorizations while the latter two are beyond individual actors and 
concern the context of theorizations. Table 4 provides an overview of the four catalysts, the 
historical phases and the institutional logics attached to them. We will now discuss each of the 
four catalysts and how they relate to, and extend prior literature. 
 
*** insert table 4 around here *** 
 
The evocation of political ideologies  
The first catalyst we identified occurred when theorizations were connected to wider public 
discourses such as political ideologies. Such actions were, for instance, visible in the first 
phase of the sedimentary process, when financial regulation ceased to be theorized as an 
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entirely technical issue but was problematized as part of a more general political ideology. 
Drawing on neo-liberalism gave certain theorizations more legitimacy and shifted the locus of 
the genesis of regulation. Alternatively, the importance of these connections between theories 
and ideologies can be explained the other way round. Wider political ideologies provide a 
repertoire of thinkable theorizations and thus limit our imaginary (Castoriadis, 1987). It is 
important not to confuse such ideologies with institutional logics as the evocation of scandals 
is a strategic theorization which some actors employ as rhetoric to act as institutional 
entrepreneur. The social movements literature provides useful insights in this respect. Green 
(2004), for instance, discusses which rhetoric forms promise more or less success with regard 
to adoption. Greenwood & Suddaby (2005) find five theorizations of change which helped the 
Big Five accounting firms to institutionalize a new organizational form. Prior literature places 
this rhetorical strategy in relation to other strategic theorizations. In our study, the role of 
political ideologies – as the other catalysts lies in a different sphere, which we elaborate later. 
Methodically, discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1993; Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Malhotra, 
2008) could provide a framework to further inquire into the connection between theorization 
and the motivation of wider political ideologies when the latter are understood as powerful 
discourses. 
 
The appropriation of scandals 
Some models of institutional change (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2002) emphasize the importance 
of scandals and crises as jolts which set processes of institutionalization in motion (cf. Reay, 
Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006, p. 994 for a critique). We did find evidence for the 
importance of scandals (such as the pensions mis-selling scandal) and crises (such as the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009) for institutional change. However, not all scandals in the 
history of financial services were perceived as connected to financial regulation. As we saw in 
the case of the pensions mis-selling scandal, the same scandal was appropriated by different 
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actors. Following this evidence, we suggest adopting Munir’s (2005) interpretation and 
emphasize that scandals do not trigger institutional change per se but need to be theorized 
themselves. When they were theorized as being connected to (faulty) financial regulation, the 
sedimentation of an institution gained momentum and legitimacy. To be sure, scandals cannot 
be theorized as connected to free will by actors. Based on our empirical material, boundary 
conditions for this catalyst could be identified as the need for a critical mass of actors to pick 
up the rhetoric of crisis as well as a certain level of media amplification. In fact, all 
theorizations of scandals that contributed to sedimentation in one form or another, enjoyed 
significant attention from the UK’s leading media. Taken from this perspective, our study 
provides insights into the role of the public media and the rhetorical struggles played out in 
shaping regulation (Hood, James, Peters, & Scott, 2004). 
 
The growing number of actors 
The third catalyst we observed concerned the diffusion of theorizations by a growing number 
of actors in the field. We found that an increasing number of actors, both individuals and 
organizations participate in the social construction process by theorizing the subject. In a 
sense, a critical mass of actors has to be reached for the sedimentation of an institution to 
occur. As discussed in the  prior literature, a growing number of actors is, by definition, 
essential for diffusion (Strang & Meyer, 1993). However, since diffusion and 
institutionalization are distinct phenomena (Ansari & Phillips, 2011; Colyvas & Jonsson, 
2011), the role of this catalyst is less obvious with regard to institutionalization. Colyvas & 
Jonsson (2011) outline that some practices become adopted but not taken-for-granted or 
legitimate and vice versa (p. 29). In our case we found that adoption is often taken as given 
and not problematized. We found that, when portrayed as failing, regulation itself becomes re-
theorized rather than how it is enacted. In the case presented here, the number of actors in the 
field does not primarily concern adopters but rather those taking part in the discursive 
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struggles of theorizing financial regulation. More theorizations then invite more actors to take 
part in this process, thereby generating momentum for the sedimentation of the institution of 
financial regulation, but potentially decoupled from actual practices. This is, to some extent, a 
reversal of what has been found in prior literature such as Ansari & Phillips (2011) which 
highlights the effect of text messaging in the UK and how unorganized consumers led to 
diffusion and institutional change. 
 
The increasing organization of actors  
A final catalyst evident from our empirical investigations is the increasing organization of 
actors around theorizations. This too, connects to Strang & Meyer’s (1993) original 
observations. They found that “theorization renders diffusion less structured by social 
relations and differences across adopters. General models facilitate meaningful 
communication and influence between weakly related actors, and between theorists and 
adopters” (p. 493). While we do not concern ourselves specifically with diffusion5, the 
unifying aspects of theorizations, creating cultural categories which appeal to larger numbers 
of actors by their abstract and universal nature, remain important. 
 
We found that while the number of regulatory bodies (not the number of overall actors in the 
field) decreased, they became increasingly organized around certain theorizations. The 
consolidation of various regulatory agencies into the FSA had two effects: First, actors 
dissenting with the FSA found it harder to promote their theorizations. Second, a change 
within the FSA’s approach led to a more significant shift as to which logic dominates at a 
particular stage. The existing literature on regulatory field formation (Hedmo, Sahlin-
Andersson, & Wedlin, 2006) is likely to be a fruitful area of research here. In some sense, our 
                                                            
5 Following Rogers’s seminal work we define diffusion as occurring when “an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995/1962, p. 14 cited in 
Strang & Meyer (1993), p. 487f) 
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whole empirical material is a story of the actors in field becoming more tightly organized 
around theorizations. This kind of organization significantly influenced the shape of the 
institution. If, for example, the first profession-based phase had prevailed, a much lower 
degree of organization would be expected.  
 
The high degree of organization of regulatory actors is in itself a sediment of the State-based 
phase of regulation, providing evidence that the catalysts themselves changed over time. This 
catalyst also demonstrates that the four catalysts are interdependent: We found that it was 
crucial for actors to build a critical mass of taken-for-granted theorizations – in order to 
sustain a logic that was robust enough to enable the organization of actors. Cultural meanings 
had to be deeply sedimented in order to enable this which in turn facilitated more 
sedimentation. We will elaborate on the connection of the four catalysts at the end of this 
section. First, however, we want to outline what these catalysts can actually contribute to the 




All four catalysts contributed to a form of institutionalization which we argue can best be 
described by the metaphor of sedimentation (Cooper et al., 1996; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). In 
our empirical material we found three dimensions of taken-for-grantedness, outlined earlier. 
Figure 1 summarized these three dimensions. First, theorizations were, as part of social 
construction, fairly conscience and strategic. Although Foucauldian scholars have shown that 
all social interactions are shaped by underlying discourses and power structures (Oakes, 
Townley, & Cooper, 1998; Townley, 1993), these willful and considered theorizations display 
the most basic dimension of taken-for-grantedness beyond reflection. Second, institutional 
logics, which we defined as groups of associated theorizations, were more suitable for mental 
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lock-ins than theorizations. For instance, market-based financial regulation can automatically 
be seen as the foundation of financial regulation by die-hard free market aficionados. Still, 
these institutional logics were frequently evoked in strategic ways suggesting a certain degree 
of consciousness and strategic intent. In particular in the later stages of our period of 
observation, we found that ideas combining prior exclusive institutional logics, namely 
market-based and risk-based logics, were strategically used to gain legitimacy. However, 
because the institutional logics were still open to conscious new, or altering, theorizations the 
institutional logics had not achieved field-level institutionalization (Greenwood et al., 2002) 
and are unlikely to do so in the near future. Third, we found that financial regulation was seen 
as the best answer to financial turbulences and, shaped in some fairly general form, had 
sedimented itself as by-product of competing theorizations and institutional logics. 
 
Following Cooper et al. (1996) we suggest that sedimentation is the appropriate metaphor for 
understanding the form of institutionalization occurring in the field. Sedimentation refers to 
the layering of one logic upon the other and, to take the geological analogy further, to 
understand the visible surface a result of “a complex and historical process of faults and 
disruptions (for example from local crises and conflicts, rather than the place movements of 
geology), erosions (from technological and market forces, rather than water) and strengths of” 
logics (p. 624). From this perspective, “[c]entral to the geological metaphor is that it includes 
not only layers and the disruptions caused by sudden transformations but also the gradual 
erosion and movements” (p. 635). Sedimentation is best understood as a mode of 
institutionalization, not as an alternative to institutionalization. The benefit of this metaphor is 
its dynamic nature as opposed to other forms of institutionalization such as linear or 
oscillating transformations (p. 643). The concept of sedimentation also helps us to address the 
conundrum of theorizations leading to taken-for-granted institutions. In each phase a layer is 
sedimented which slowly becomes part of the emerging institution of financial regulation. 
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This sediment influences future theorizations without being ostensibly visible or consciously 
available. But the sediment is not solid and disruptions such as the evocation of political 
ideologies and the appropriation of scandals can change the surface significantly while still 
not fully disposing of the sediment left by prior theorizations. The more subcutaneous aspects 
of sedimentation, which go beyond strategic theorizations, are reflected in the other two 
catalysts, the growing number of actors and their increasing organization. Viewed this way, 
theorizations lead to institutionalization through the sedimentation they leave behind for 
future theorizations. Competing institutional logics, consistent with Thornton & Ocasio 
(2008), are then the product and not the source of change. Change comes from the 
theorizations of institutional entrepreneurs which cannot wilfully determine cognitive taken-
for-granted institutions but influence them through the sediments their theorizations leave 
behind. 
 
The institution that came about through the process of sedimentation has several defining 
features. Financial regulation has achieved taken-for-grantedness in the sense that abandoning 
it is not an option for a knowledgeable actor in the field. Only far left autonomists and 
anarcho-capitalists would today argue against any form of financial regulation. Additionally, 
certain conceptions about what is financial regulation have become institutionalized. For 
instance, the State as a central actor is evoked in nearly all discourses that occurred after 
phase one. Alternative theorizations, such as “gentlemanly” self-regulation (Augur, 2000), 
ceased to be meaningful alternatives. A little more UK-specific but still firmly sedimented is 
the establishment of specific organizations and types of organizations by States. Individual 
organizations, their names and specific functions vary along the phases and logics. The need 
for these types of organizations as a part of financial regulation, however, is undisputed. By 
1997, when phase three came to an end, the repertoire of thinkable and legitimate 
theorizations had already become severely limited. For instance, drawing on the notion of 
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deregulation had become taken-for-granted, although this was not necessarily obvious – given 
the State’s influence on financial services. Also, the term deregulation is theorized in various 
ways with no single interpretation achieving institutionalization despite some degree of 
diffusion. We understand the diffusion of regulatory practices as evidence of the 
institutionalization of something more general – namely, that the concept of financial 
regulation is an inevitable way to organize the financial services sector. This 
conceptualization of institutionalization connects not only to Tolbert & Zucker’s (1996) 
model but also to what has been more recently discussed as the formation of a regulatory field 
(Hedmo et al., 2006). 
 
While each of the four catalysts are, at least partially, discussed in the prior literature, part of 
their novelty lies in their combination. Whereas institutional logics connect the individual-, 
field- and societal-levels, the proposed catalysts firmly rest at the field-level. Thus, they allow 
us to understand how theorizations by actors in the field led to field-level taken-for-granted 
institutions. Due to the qualitative and exploratory nature of our empirical inquiry we cannot 
fully determine the interdependencies of the catalysts. However, our case gives us the 
opportunity to observe some connections which might be developed into testable propositions 
in future research. As shown in table 4 not all catalysts were evident in all phases, we know 
that all catalysts do not need to be present in order for sedimentation (institutionalization) to 
occur. Consistent with the social movements literature which emphasizes the power of 
rhetoric (Green, 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), the evocation of scandals was the 
springboard for the sedimentation process by putting financial markets on the agenda. In 
general we found the catalysts to be additive, the more of them occurred, the stronger the 
sedimentation process. This additive moment was also evident within the catalysts. According 
to particular theorizations, the organization of the actors in the field, grew stronger over time 
and thus facilitated the sedimentary process. In general, the four catalysts are mechanisms by 
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which the visible surface is shaped and the lower levels, which are the sediments of older 




Following Dover & Lawrence (2010) we believe that institutional theory offers important 
insights for practitioners and in the following, we highlight some key conclusions for the 
practices of financial regulation:  
 
Since we found the relation between theorization and institutionalization was mediated by 
what we called catalysts of sedimentation, practitioners will need to be aware of the by-
products of their on-going struggles. As previous literature has shown, actors can actively 
contribute to institutionalization – cf. Kodak’s attempts to institutionalize amateur 
photography (Munir, 2005; Munir & Phillips, 2005). Our research extends this insight by 
suggesting that even when theorizations or whole institutional logics ostensibly become 
obsolete, they leave behind a sediment which adds to a cognitive institution and has to be 
taken into consideration. This implies that those promoting certain financial regulations need 
to be wary of the taken-for-granted legacy of prior theorizations. This effectively limits the 
legitimate options of proponents. The four catalysts we identified above provide indications 
of occurrences that are closely associated with the production of such sediments. Some of 
them are more deliberate (the evocation of political ideologies and the appropriation of 
scandals), while others are more indirect (the growing number of actors and the increasing 
organization of actors). 
 
Our point is that we are not aiming to give actors advice on how to best promote or undermine 
a certain form of financial regulation. Rather, we want to draw attention to aspects of the 
39 
 
(public) debates which are often neglected in favour of quarrels between competing 
proponents of institutional logics. Also, current developments support our insight that the 
field level struggles of actors are far from over and that theorizations pronounced long dead 
still have direct and indirect influences: At the time of writing, current thinking – under a 
coalition Government elected in 2010, suggests that regulation of financial markets in the UK  
is moving back towards a two-tier structure – with the break-up of the FSA and the suggestion 
that two new regulators should be created: one would be the new Consumer Protection and 
Markets Authority (CPMA) which will focus on retail financial services, the other on the 
prudential side (FSA, 2011b, 2012). The language of the regulator has, once again, shifted to 
‘intervention’ and also, ‘intrusion’ – in particular, a suggestion that there will be ‘heavy 
weight’ interventions in retail financial services: The main difference is that the regulatory 
authority (CPMA) will target products (i.e. financial promotions, product disclosure, how 
firms design products) in addition to selling practices – as was the case in the past, (FSA, 
2011b). Industry representatives are, unsurprisingly, arguing that heavy-handed regulation 




In this paper we have discussed the connection between theorization and institutionalization. 
We started out by outlining the motivation of the paper: how do conscious and sometimes 
even strategic theorizations lead to cognitive taken-for-granted institutions? Empirically, we 
have shown how, over the last twenty-five years, competing institutional logics within UK 
financial services regulation have led to the institutionalization of financial regulation and is 
characterised by three features: First, there are no alternatives to financial services regulation; 
second, the State is naturally regarded as central actor and third, a web of organizations is 
naturally seen as necessary for financial regulation. We also identified four catalysts which, 
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when concurring with theorization, foster the sedimentation of an institution. By 
sedimentation we mean the lasting by-product of the continuous and dynamic struggles of 
actors in the processes of social construction. 
 
However, every study has its limitations. Our study mainly draws on secondary material and 
focuses on one particular regime. Future research will have to show whether all four catalysts 
hold in different empirical settings. Also, future research will be needed to identify the 
influences that determine why some theorizations contribute directly towards 
institutionalization while others, as found in this case, only do so indirectly. 
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e.g. the suggestion of a regulatory approach by the Chairman of SIB / FSA 
 
 
Competing institutional logics 
e.g. market-based financial regulation 
 
 
Taken-for-granted cognitive institution 
e.g. financial regulation in its general contemporary form 
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